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Turner Broadcasting ·cable access rules would have contradicted the
Court's finding that they distinguished among speakers "based only
upon the manner in which speakers transmit their messages to viewers, and not upon the messages they carry." 316 By contrast , manipulating the marketplace of ideas can be the government 's objective
even without a content trigger .816 Consequently, the Hurley Court
found the parade access requirement to have this purpose, even
though it contained no content trigger. 317
In another respect, the presence of a content trigger can be·dispositive whereas its absence is not. In addition to being evidence of a
broader, marketplace manipulation purpose, the content trigger is
also relevant later in the means/tailoring inquiry. Specifically, in the
unusual instances where the Court finds the government's asserted
interest in promoting diversity of viewpoints through the means of
compelling a private speaker to grant access to other private speakers "compelling,"318 the question then becomes whether the government has achieved this objective through the least speech-restrictive
means .819 The significance of the content trigger is that it threatens
to limit speech, through self-censorship, at the same time that it
mandates speech. 820 Thus, where it is possible to achieve the
government's objective through an access requirement without a
content trigger, the fact that one is included will render the access
requirement invalid.
Understanding the content trigger ·as relevant to the tailoring
inquiry explains why the lack of a content trigger would not change
the result in Tomillo or PG&E, while the addition of one might well
render the Pruneyard and Turner Broadcasting access requirements
invalid. Where the government does not have a compelling interest
in manipulating the marketplace of ideas to preserve a diversity of

seeks to foster cannot be obtained by including speakers whose speech agrees with
appellant's.").
315. Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 645.
816. See, e.g., Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 87 (noting that state's purpos e in requiring general mall access is to expand "rights of free speech and petition").
317. See Hurky, 515 U.S. at 578 (determining that the law's "apparent object is
simply to require speakers to modify the content of their expression to whate ver
extent beneficiaries of the ·law choose to alter it with messages of their own").
318. See infra Part IV.A4.
319. See, e.g., PG&E, 475 U.S. at 20 (accepting "the State's interest in promoting speech by making a variety of views available to appellant's customers• bu t
noting that because "the means chosen to advance variety tend to inhibit expression of appellant's views, . . . the Commission's order is not a narrowly tailored
means of furthering this int erest").
320. See, e.g., id. at 20 ("Our cases establish that the State cannot advance
some points of view by burdening the expression of others.").
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ysis. More importantly , however, the nature of the compelled expression impacts the tailoring inquiry. Specifically, the government cannot compel private speech to pursue an ideological objective. It will
thus be difficult for the governme nt to demonstrate that compelling
ideological expression is necessary to pur sue its nonspeech objective.
By contrast, compelling nonideological expression, such as commercial speech, may be more easily justified because it more obviously
re lates to legitimate, non speech govern ment objective s.
In sum, speaker impact is important in compelled expression anal ysis, but it is not determinative as the Court has periodically suggested. Only once has the Court seen a case where the government
action imposed speake r burdens arguably different from those imposed in speech restraint cases. The greater emphasis on speaker
impact throughout ·the rhetoric of the -compelled expression cases is
thus misleading. Speaker impact is a proper consideration in mi-dleveling balancing analysis , but only after this level of review ha s
been determined by looking to the government's purpose .

D. Summarizing a Coherent Compelled Expression Analysis
A coherent analysis of compelled expression flows from the same
free speech clause values that und er pin the doctrine of speech restraints. Most fundamentally , compelled expression analysis should
iook to whether the government's purpose is to manipulate the mar ketpl ace of ideas or whether its purpose is not related to expressio n .
Where th e government acts to manipulate the marketplace of
ideas, strict scrutiny applies unless the compelled expression falls
into the narrow category of factual disclosures imposed to enhance
consumer information, which the Court has found to comport with
free speech values. Under strict scrutiny, ' the government must articulate a compelling purpo se for the expression compulsion and demonstrate that there are no less expre ssion-burde nsome means to achieve
it . Except for disclosures within the narrow category set out ab9ve,
where th e government compels expre ssion of its- own choosing it .will
rarely be able to make this showing. Where the government compels
one speaker to grant access to another or compels contributions to
fund priv ate expres sion, the government may prevail if it demonstrates a compelling interest in ensuring that a quasi-public medium
of expression stays open to a range of speakers or if the government
shows that it has appropria tely created a public forum.
Where the government acts for a n onspeech purpose but
incidentally compels expression or compels contributions, some · of
which are used .to fund expression, the government 's nonsp eech purpose invokes mid-level balancing :review . Factors in this analysis
include the importance of the .government purpo se, the existence of
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alternate, nonspeech-burdensome means to achieve it, the magnitude
of the speaker burden , including the individual autonomy impact
occasioned by the type of expression compelled as well as the possibly
differential impact of the compulsion on different types of speakers.

V.

CONCLUSION

There is currently no coherent doctrine apparent in the Court's
compelled expression cases. It is possible, however, to pick among the
mass of labels and distinctions those considerations that should,
consistent with underlying free speech clause values, guide decision
of these cases. They can then be assembled into a framework that
resembles, although not exactly, the speech restraint ·framework .
Once assembled, this new framework can both explain and harmonize the results of past cases as well as provide coherent categories
for evaluating future compelled expression requirements in a way
that comports with the values that underpin the free speech guarantee.

